Airlines' Privatisation in Europe: Fully versus Partial Divestiture by Alfredo Macchiati & Giovanni Siciliano
Airlines’ Privatisation in Europe:
Fully versus Partial Divestiture
Alfredo Macchiati - Giovanni Siciliano*
University of Rome “Tor Vergata” CONSOB, Rome
and
Ferrovie dello Stato
We  study the experience of the three fully privatised European
airlines: British Airways, Lufthansa and Iberia. All airlines have
undergone a deep restructuring much before (and in view of) the
privatisation, with the state bearing most of the related financial cost
(especially in the cases of Lufthansa and British Airways), and have
taken over (before, after or in the same year of the privatisation)
their main domestic competitors. Following full privatisation, labour
productivity (particularly for Iberia and Lufthansa) and profitability
increase compared to other major European state-controlled airlines;
production capacity grows compared to the pre-privatisation period,
as well as average salaries (though reflecting the increased labour
productivity). Preliminary evidences from stock returns show that
investors do not seem require a premium for political risk to invest
in shares of fully privatised airlines. In general, these results imply
that government ownership in the airline industry can be
detrimental, at least to firms’ efficiency, while full privatisation does
not seem to expose private shareholders to significant political risk.
[JEL Classification: L33, G38]
1. - Introduction
The  rationale for airlines privatisation is the usual one:
dissatisfaction with state owned enterprises’ performance. This
dissatisfaction has its theoretical roots in various important
contributions (see, among many, Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987;
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Giuseppe D’Addio for generous research assistance.Laffont and Tirole, 1991; Shleifer, 1998) and finds empirical
support in a large body of research on how privatisation impacts
the financial and operating performance of divested firms
(recently surveyed in Meggison, 2005). Research on welfare effects
(Florio, 2004; Hancock and Waddams Price, 1998; Eckel, Eckel
and Singal, 1997) seem less supportive for privatisation, in
particular for consumers: at least in the British experience, other
drivers of prices (such as regulation, market structure, exogenous
changes in cost) have largely overshadowed improved company
performance due to ownership change.
According to Shleifer (1998), the only industrial setting which
may be considered favourable for public ownership — innovation
relatively unimportant, weak competition, consumer choice inef-
fective — is completely unrealistic in case of airlines. The pres-
sure of entrants with new business model (“low cost” airlines) has
been disruptive and volatility in demand and earnings has been
remarkable. In this environment, incumbent airlines must define
new strategies and reform themselves, tasks which are tradition-
ally not the easiest ones for state-owned enterprises.
Privatisation in the airlines sector has been less intensive than
in other industries; governments have historically claimed absolute
sovereignty over their airspaces for military considerations. This
attitude created strong links with airlines carriers, which in Europe
(but not in US) took the form of public ownership. After the
restructuring which followed the early years of the airlines industry,
a single subsidised state-owned company emerged in virtually every
European country (Millward, 2005). Although thereafter some
companies were privatised, government ownership is widespread,
mainly because national airlines retain a content of prestige (“to
show the national flag in world airports”) and a regularly scheduled
carrier is still considered, by many countries, a tool of commercial
policy.
The aim of this paper is to provide new evidence of the im-
pact of ownership on firm performance in the airlines sector, com-
paring the outcomes of the two main policy options followed by
most of the European countries: partial versus full privatisation.
First, we show that fully privatised airlines (British Airways,
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before (and in view of) the privatisation, with the state bearing
most of the related financial cost, and have taken over (before,
after or in the same year of the privatisation) their main domestic
competitors. Then, we compare the performance of the fully
privatised airlines against other partially privatised European
carriers (mainly SAS and Air France-KLM), using accounting and
stock market data. We show that following full privatisation labour
productivity (particularly for Iberia and Lufthansa) and
profitability increase compared to other major European state-
controlled airlines; production capacity grows compared to the
pre-privatisation period, as well as average salaries (though
reflecting the increased labour productivity). Preliminary evidenc-
es from stock returns show that investors do not seem require a
premium for political risk to invest in shares of fully privatised
airlines. In general, these results imply that government ownership
in the airline industry can be detrimental, at least to firms’
efficiency, while full privatisation does not seem to expose private
shareholders to significant political risk.
2. - State Ownership and Intervention in the Airline Industry:
Stylised Facts and Previous Research
2.1 State ownership in the European airline industry has
been quite resilient: with the exception of British Airways which
was fully privatised in 1987, we have to wait until the late nineties
and the beginning of the new century to see other European
carriers being fully privatised (Lufthansa in 1997 and Iberia in
2001). Many airlines have been partially privatised, although the
government has always remained the major shareholder (Table
1),
1 while others, such as Olympic, TAP and Air Lingus, are still
100% state owned. The case of the Irish carrier Air Lingus is
interesting because it shows how restructuring is possible even
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1 We have included Alitalia among partially privatised companies although the
Italian state is currently trying to sell its residual stake.without privatisation. In fact, the management was able to
transform Air Lingus into a true “low cost” and profitable airline
without any interference by the government (Booz Allen Ha-
milton, 2007).
For five out the seven airlines reported in Table 1 the
government stake is quite high (even disregarding indirect
ownership rights) so that we can safely assume that the state has
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TABLE 1
PARTIAL PRIVATISATION IN EUROPEAN AIRLINES
Evolution of State Property Rights
Year of Initial Divestiture
* Residual State ownership
in 2006
**
















* In parenthesis is reported the government stake initially sold (in percentage).
** Percentage of total voting rights.
*** The French state has a 18.6% stake in Air France - KLM which in turn controls
100% of Air France.
**** Direct stake of the Dutch sate. The French state has also an indirect stake in
KLM, having a 18.6% stake in Air France - KLM which in turn owns 49% of voting
rights and 97.5% of cash flow rights of KLM. The Dutch state has an option to
increase its direct stake in KLM to 50.1% under certain circumstances.not yet relinquished company control. For Air France and KLM,
which merged in 2004, the situation is less clear.
Before the merge the French state had a 54% participation in
Air France while the Dutch state controlled 14.7% of KLM voting
rights through cumulative preference shares. The deal was
structured to create an holding company (Air France - KLM)
controlling 100% of Air France but only 49% of KLM and both
companies continued to operate independently.
2 The stake of the
French state in the holding company reduced to 44% after the deal
and then further diluted to 25 and 18.6% (end of 2006), while
employees currently control 13.8% of the voting rights; the Dutch
state agreed to reduce its stake in the holding company over time
in a similar proportion to the French state.
3 The deal was based
on a three year transitional period in which the remaining 51% of
KLM voting rights would have been held by the Dutch state and
two Dutch foundations
4, in order to protect KLM traffic rights.
5
2.2 Regulation has, to a great extent, shaped the structure of
the industry, slowing mergers and cross-shareholdings (even
between national carriers), even though until 1992 there was no
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2 Actually, Air France-KLM owns depositary receipts representing KLM
common shares tendered in the exchange offer in excess of 49% of the nominal
share capital and voting rights of KLM. These depositary receipts carry the
economic rights, but not the voting rights, of the underlying KLM common shares.
The underlying KLM common shares are held by Stichting Administratiekantoor
KLM (SAK I), a foundation incorporated under Dutch law. Air France-KLM also
owns depositary receipts representing KLM’s cumulative preference shares C. These
depositary receipts carry the economic rights, but not the voting rights, of the
underlying cumulative preference shares C. The underlying cumulative preference
shares C are held by Stichting Administratiekantoor Cumulatief Preferente
Aandelen C KLM (SAK II), another foundation incorporated under Dutch law. Each
of SAK I and SAK II are managed by a board of three independent persons: one
appointed by Air France, one by KLM and a chairman appointed jointly by the
appointees of Air France and KLM. The majority of the board members of each
foundation, including the chairman, are Dutch nationals and residents. The
decisions of each foundation’s board must be by unanimous consent. Through
these complex arrangements, Air France - KLM controls 49% of KLM voting rights
but owns 97.5% of KLM cash flow rights.
3 We do not have precise data on the post-deal stake in Air France - KLM of
the Dutch state; however, latest SEC filing by Air France - KLM do not indicate
the Dutch state amongst shareholders having more than 5% of the voting rights.
4 See footnote 2.
5 The Dutch state has a direct stake of 5.9% in KLM and has an option to
increase its share of voting rights up to 50.1% under certain circumstance.European legislation allowing national states to forbid mergers
between national airlines.
Both European regulation and commercial agreements between
the US and each single European country include “nationality
clauses” conditioning traffic rights to shareholders nationality. Such
clauses, by linking commercial growth and ownership structure,
hinder consolidation and privatisation. But even when for European
member states it became impossible not to grant an operating
licence to an airline on the basis that it was not controlled by local
nationals,
6 the nexus between ownership regulation and traffic
rights on the transatlantic market (which covers issues such as the
number of airlines allowed to fly, the points that can be served and
the number of flights per week that may be operated) has helped
politicians to keep states as important shareholders.
On the transatlantic market traffic rights are linked, through
the so-called “open skies” agreements. “Open skies” are bilateral
agreements between the US and EU states which condition traffic
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6 According to Council Regulation (EEC) 2407/92 an airline from an EC
member state will not be entitled to be granted or continue to hold an operating
licence unless it satisfies the requirement that it: «shall be owned and continue to
be owned directly or through majority ownership by member states an/or nationals
of member states. It shall at all times be effectively controlled by such states or
such nationals».
TABLE 2
STATE OWNERSHIP BY INDUSTRY SECTORS 
IN THE EU 25 COUNTRIES (2005)
Sector %








Source: Data kindly provided by Privatisation Barometer.rights to shareholders nationality. These agreements, which
produced advantages in terms of market share for the US carriers,
in spite of their name, have slowed market liberalisation and
curtailed greater cross investments between airlines; they were
considered an infringement of the Treaty by the Court of Justice
(although only in 2002).
For all these reasons it is no surprise if airlines is the  industry
with the highest share of government ownership among EU25
countries (Table 2).
2.3 During the nineties most of the European state-owned
airlines were in need of massive injections of new capital. State
aids, approved by the European Commission, were generous
(Table 3), testifying another important form of public intervention
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TABLE 3
STATE AID TO THE MAJOR
EUROPEAN AIRLINES (1990-2006)
$ Mln $ Mln $ Mln $ Mln $ Mln





















* Not classified as state aid.
** Contribution of € 800 million by Germany to Lufthansa’s pension fund in the
context of its partial privatisation — Not classified as state aid.
Source: our calculation from DOGANIS R. (2005), ECDG Competition Website,
BALFOUR J. (2003).in the industry. Governments took the view that financial aids
would have helped restructuring and recovery plans, paving the
way for subsequent privatisation; but this was not always the case
(as for Olympic in 1994 and Alitalia in 1997). The three fully
privatised companies analysed in this paper benefited from large
state aids as well (in the case of British Airways even after the
privatisation).
The European Commission showed an indulgent approach
toward such form of state intervention, allowing some €13 billion
of public funding to the major European airlines, and argued that
state aids were necessary to enable airlines to prepare themselves
in view of the liberalisation of the sector. Since 1997, however, the
Commission took a more severe approach and state aids fell
substantially, even compared to other transportation sectors.
2.4 Amongst the huge empirical literature on the impact of
privatisation on financial and operating performance, there are
several studies that look specifically at the airline industry. Green
and Vogelsang (1994) show how British Airways (BA) was
restructured in order to set the way for successful privatisation,
while Yarrow (1995) provides an overview of the impact of
privatisation and deregulation on the UK airline industry. Eckel,
Eckel and Singal (1997) study the impact of BA and Air Canada
privatisations on prices, finding that airfares in the markets served
by the two carriers fell significantly when they got fully privatised.
Erlich et al. (1994) focus on the impact of ownership on the rates
of firm-specific productivity growth and show that a full switch
to private ownership may increase the rate of cost decline by as
much as 1.7 per cent a year. In the same stream of research, Ng
and Seabright (2001) look at the impact of ownership and market
structure on rents to labour in the airlines sector: their results
show that while the effect of competition is harder to disentangle,
state ownership has a large upward impact on costs. Backx et al.
(2004) provide evidence that, controlling for firm size, domestic
competition, home region and home GNP levels, state controlled
airlines have lower performance levels and are less efficiency
oriented than private airlines.
Another stream of research concentrates on the impact of the
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(2007) compare a portfolio of shares of (majority) state-owned
airlines against a portfolio of shares of privately owned airlines
around the 9/11 shock and find a lower beta for state owned
portfolio. Such evidence can be rationalized assuming that
residual state ownership in a partially privatized firm may serve
as a commitment to mitigate political risk (i.e. backlash against
previous policy choices generated by political shifts) (Perotti,
1995); in fact, the state, by sequential sales, can commit itself not
to interfere in the business and not to redistribute its value
through more credible regulation (Lo Passo and Macchiati, 1997).
The results by De Bruijn et al. (2007) can also be interpreted
assuming that governments have a different pay-off function than
private investors and opt for lower risk project.
Bortolotti and Faccio (2004) show that, irrespective of the
industry sector, partly privatised companies are more valuable
than fully privatised ones; an interpretation of this evidence
consistent with Perotti’s model is that partial privatisation allows
governments to bear the residual risk of political interference,
while such risk is more heavily discounted in the market value of
fully privatised firms. Beltratti et al. (2007) focus on a financial
measure of political risk in mature financial markets and find that
a portfolio of companies in the bottom quartile in terms of
government control rights (thus including fully privatised
companies) significantly outperform a portfolios formed by stocks
with higher government residual stake.
According to a different and more traditional perspective, when
partial privatisation does not represent an intermediate step and it
does not prelude to a complete exit (so that the state is not willing
to give up redistributive goals), a very inefficient incentive structure
can prevail. With a hybrid ownership arrangement, the company
will pursue profit maximisation or redistribution depending on a
series of variables (relative weight and concentration of private
ownership, political cycle); in the meantime the management can
behave very opportunistically as the firm is isolated from the market
of corporate control. Hence, partially privatised firms can be less
efficient than fully state owned firms. In fact, Erlich et al. (1994)
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around the 60% stake, suggesting that a specific level of mixed
ownership can be less efficient than full state ownership.
3. - Restructuring in Fully Privatised Airlines
We start our analysis providing some clinical evidences on the
restructuring of fully privatised European airlines (British Airlines,
Lufthansa and Iberia), showing how releasing firm from
government control creates more entrepreneurial opportunities.
We also provide some information on the method and the timing
of the exit by the State (Table 4 reports some summary
information on the timing of the privatisation for the three airlines
considered). In the next section we will provide instead some
quantitative evidence on the changes in financial and operating
performance after privatisation, taking partially privatised airlines
as benchmarks.
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TABLE 4
EUROPEAN CARRIERS FULLY PRIVATISED
Year % for Sale (or % dilution % Residual
in State voting rights) State Stake
British Airways 1987 100 (IPO) 0
Iberia Lineas 2000 41.2 (private sale to BA, 53.5
Areas de Espana AA and 5 Spanish
institutional investors)
2001 53.5 (IPO) 0
Deutsche Lufthansa 1989 28.5 (dilution due to 51.4
new equity issues not
subscribed by the State)
1994 15.7 (dilution due to 35.7
new equity issues not
subscribed by the State)
1997 37.5 (Public Offering) 0
Source: Goldman Sachs.In organising the qualitative evidence on restructuring we
adopt the taxonomy proposed by D’Souza et al. (2006), who
classify restructuring events in three broad families: 1)
organisational/operational (reorganisation of firm’s production
methods,  i.e. closing, consolidating, or overall reorganising of
production facilities); 2) financial (reduction in the leverage,
restructuring of loans, etc.); 3) acquisition and divestment. Data
are collected from annual reports, firms’ websites and press news
for the years around the privatisation; in the case of Iberia and
Lufthansa, privatised through sequential offerings, we consider the
year of full privatisation as the reference one.
7
British Airways
British Airways (BA) was a fully state-owned company until
1986. In 1987 the state sold its entire stake through an IPO and the
company was listed on the stock exchange. Around 1980, just after
the privatisation announcement, BA was viewed as a largely
overstaffed and inefficient airline, which occasionally generated
substantial losses.
8 In 1981 a new chairman was appointed and he
embarked in an ambitious employment reduction plan based on
generous severance pay incentives (employees fell in fact from 52,310
in March 1981 to 36,794 in March 1984; – 42.2%). The staff reduction
plan forced BA to post large extraordinary provision for redundancy.
BA decided however to concentrate most of these provisions (plus
supplementary aircraft depreciation) on the 1981/82 balance sheet,
so that the accounts for the following years would have been
unaffected by impact of the restructuring costs. Other restructuring
initiatives involved the cut of some unprofitable routes, the closing
of the cargo-only services and the sell off of some minor subsidiaries.
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7 We  get a restructuring activity (measured by the number of restructurings)
per firm higher than in D’SOUZA J. et AL. (2006); the difference can be due to a
different discretional appreciation of what a restructuring is or to the more
turbulent environment of the airline sector.
8 Most of the information and data quoted in text come from GREEN R. -
VOGELSANG I. (1994) and GALAL A. - JONES L. - TANDON P. - VOGELSANG I. (1994).Although by early 1980s BA was technically bankrupt (liabilities
exceeded assets by roughly 250 million pounds), it was able to
survive and to borrow abroad thanks to the implicit guarantee by
the UK State. Anyway, BA turnaround proved effective and the
1982/83 and 1983/84 financial accounts showed large positive
operating results; by 1985, BA net equity returned positive.
In 1985 BA had to give up to its main domestic competitor,
British Caledonian (BC), some of its routes (basically those to
Saudi Arabia), as BC was arguing that the privatisation would
have created a dominant position. BA, however, received from BC
its South America business and eventually retained its dominant
role in the UK market.
By 1985, BA had turned into a relatively efficient and
profitable company and the government accelerated the procedure
to sell its stake. However, it was only in January 1987 that the
government sold its entire 100% stake in BA, valued 900 million
pounds, through an IPO.
In 1987, just after the privatisation, BA acquired BC for
roughly 250 million pound, but the Monopolies and Merger
Commission, which approved the transaction in November 1987,
forced BA to surrender some European routes of BC previously
served by both airlines (plus 5,000 landing slots at Gatwick
Airport, where most of BC operation were based).
Thanks to BC acquisition, BA expanded significantly its
production capacity: RPK
9 grew by roughly 20% between 1986
and 1988 and the number of employee came back to the levels
prevailing at the beginning of the 1980s. Restructuring operations
in the three years following privatisation involved essentially
services enhancement; in 1990 BA opened new brands (World
Traveller in international routes and Euro Traveller in internal
ones) and services (self ticketing and new routes to Japan). In
1989 BA tried to acquire a stake in Sabena World Airlines, but it
was only in 1992-1993 that BA carried out important acquisitions
(49.9% of TAT European Airlines, 49% of Deutsche BA and 25%
of Quantas).
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9 RPK stands for Revenue Paying Passengers per Kilometre Flown.Iberia
Iberia was a state-owned airline until 1999 (although
employees had a 5% stake); in 2000 the state sold a 41% stake to
private investors (5 Spanish institutional investors, British Airways
and American Airlines) through a private deal. Subsequently, in
2001 Iberia was listed through an IPO in which the state sold its
residual stake of roughly 54%.
Iberia restructuring started around 1997 and then
consolidated in the following years. The main initiative was the
so called “Employment Conditions Unifying Pact”, which unified
contract terms for pilots, cabin crew and ground personnel of
Iberia and the newly acquired company Aviaco. In 2000 a 4 years-
lasting labour agreement was signed, linking salary growth to the
actual Consumer Price Index dynamics. After September 11,
(following an agreement with the government) a “Redundancy
Procedure” was signed, allowing a dismissal of 2,500 employee.
In 2000 Iberia sold its stake in Areolinas Argentinas and a 6.7%
stake in the software company Amadeus (posting a gross capital
gain of 390 million euro).
Cost optimisation was the other pillar of the restructuring
initiatives: in 2000 Iberia’s unit cost were below the industry
average (notwithstanding average stage length lower than Air
France and British Airways). On the commercial side, Iberia
reinforced its leadership on the routes between Spain and Latin
America and the market share differential against other
competitors (mainly Air France) increased substantially (from
roughly 1% in 1997 to 4.7% in 2000). In the next years Iberia
started a plan to cut costs and boost productivity (“Master Plan
2002-2005”), reducing by 4% commissions to tour operators, and
to reduce employment (“Labour Force Reduction Plan”); in the
meantime, Iberia divested from many non core sectors and opened
new long haul connections. Cost cut were realised also through
fleet renewal and partial reduction in aircraft models (in 2000
Iberia had 5 different Airbus models and 5 different Boeing
models, while in 2005 had 6 Airbus models but only 2 Boeing
models; Table 5).
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Until 1993 the German state controlled roughly 51% of the
voting rights of Lufthansa. In 1994 Lufthansa raised new equity
capital through a rights issue and the state sold its stock rights
through a public offering so that its stake reduced to roughly 35%.
By 1996 the Federal Republic had only indirect stakes in
Lufthansa through other state-controlled entities (KFW, Deutsche
Bahn and Deutsche Postbank) and controlled roughly 39% of the
voting rights (Bortolotti and Faccio, 2006). In 1997 the state sold
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TABLE 5
NETWORKS AND FLEET OF IBERIA AND LUFTHANSA








— Airbus 80 (of which 52 A320) 101 (of which 58 A320)
— Boeing 26 18
— Other 37 40
ordered 2 5








— Airbus 105 127
— Boeing 116 118
— Other 59 82
ordered 31 48
Source: AEA Yearbooks.a 37.5% stake in Lufthansa (raising an 2.7 billion US dollar) and
the company was virtually fully privatised.
Lufthansa, which was almost bankrupt in 1991, carried out
most of the restructuring initiatives between the first stock rights
offering of 1994 and the final share offering of 1997. In the peri-
od 1993-1994 the government started the negotiations to privatise
Lufthansa, but one of the key issue was how to deal with the large
pension deficit accumulated by the company. Eventually, the gov-
ernment agreed to inject 1 billion DM to cover current pension
deficit and to offer an allowance for constituting a separate
Lufthansa pension fund. In 1994 the company was reorganised
according to a divisional model and then some divisions were
transformed into separate subsidiaries. In the same year the com-
pany repositioned itself in international markets and Lufthansa
Cargo set up a subsidiary in India; the company acquired stakes
in US and Asian catering services companies, becoming the biggest
airline caterer in the world.
In 1996 Lufthansa launched a cost reduction plan called “Pro-
gramme 15” (where 15 stands for the objective of reducing costs
to 15 pfennig per seat-kilometres by 2001, compared to 17.7 pfen-
nig in 1996). In 1997 it launched the Star Alliance network with
other important carriers (such as Air Canada, SAS, Thai Airways),
now considered the “frontrunner” in the airline industry’s effort
to build a comprehensive global network. As far as the fleet is
concerned, Lufthansa increased by approximately 25% the num-
ber of aircrafts between 1996 and 2000, but it made no rational-
isation in the models and, differently from Iberia, expanded main-
ly on the routes outside Europe.
In the years following privatisation Lufthansa made some
important acquisitions. In 2000 it acquired a 20% stake in British
Midland, primarily to secure valuable slots at Heathrow airport,
and in 2001 it acquired a 24.9% stake in the German airline
Eurowings (a national carrier with approximately 4% of market
share); in the following years Lufthansa exercised a call option to
acquire a further 24.1% of Eurowings and then, in the 2005, the
remaining 51%. Both acquisitions were cleared by the German
Competition Authorities (the Bundeskartellamt) in 2001 and by
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which hinged in particular on the number of slots.
4. - The Financial and Operating Performance of Fully 
Privatised Airlines
4.1 In order to asses the impact of privatisation on the three
fully privatised airlines considered in this study we compare their
performance against a sample of state controlled airlines in the 3
years before and after the privatisation. Data are obtained from
balance sheets (Worldscope data base) and from the Association
of European Airlines (AEA), while stock market data are from
Thomson Financial Datastream.
We  match each fully privatised airline against comparable
partially privatised carrier(s) looking at how the extra-performance
against such benchmark changes after full privatisation.
10 In order
to better isolate the impact of full privatisation, we choose control
firms that are in a similar situation during the pre-event window.
In particular, we take state-controlled European airlines of similar
size to those under study.
In the case of British Airways, fully privatised in 1987, we
take as control firm Lufthansa, mainly because we do not have
data for other state controlled airlines of similar size at that time.
11
For Iberia (fully privatised in 2001) and Lufthansa (fully privatised
in 1997) comparable state-controlled (partially privatised) airlines
are SAS, Air France (AF), KLM and Alitalia.
We  decide however to drop from our control sample KLM
because, starting from 1998, it was in a border line situation: it
can not be considered a fully privatised company, but neither a
fully fledged state controlled company. In fact, since 1998 (and
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10 Since we have very few observations concentrated in one industry sector we
do not use the standard methodologies of analysing median changes before and after
privatisation proposed by MEGGINSON W.L. - NASH R. - RANDENBORGH M. (1994), which
is suited for large database.
11 We have data for Air France, but at the time of British Airway privatisation
Air France was much smaller. In fact, in 1987 Air France was just one of the four
French State controlled airlines, which then merged in 1992.until the merger with AF in 2004) the Dutch state, after selling all
its common shares, retained a relatively small fraction of voting
rights (14%) through cumulative preference shares.
We  also dropped Alitalia from the control sample because it
tends to behave much differently from SAS and AF over the time
period considered. First, although Alitalia was less indebted than
the SAS and Air France until 2001, it was much less profitable
(Graph 1).
Second, Alitalia expanded its production capacity at a much
slower rate than SAS and Air France (Graph 2). Although until
1997-1998 Alitalia grew approximately at the same rate of SAS
and AF, over the entire 10 year period 1995-2004, SAS and AF
expanded their combined revenues and employment by 80% more
than Alitalia, while their combined ASK
12 grew by 50% more than











1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Debt/sales differential Operating profit/sales differential
GRAPH 1
ALITALIA VS SAS AND AIR FRANCE:
INDEBTEDNESS AND PROFITABILITY DIFFERENTIALS
Note: data show the difference between the ratios for Alitalia and the weighted
average of the ratios for Air France and SAS.
Source: calculation on Worldscope and company accounts data.
12 ASK stands for Available Seats per Kilometre Flown and it is a standard
indicator of production capacity in the airlines sector.the Alitalia ASK. Moreover, in the second part of the period
considered, SAS and AF expanded abroad through significant
acquisitions (SAS acquired Spanair and Braathens, while AF
merged with KLM in 2004; SAS also has a significant investment
in the hotel business through the Raddison SAS hotel chain), while
Alitalia never embarked in any significant foreign acquisition.
Hence, even though all the three companies were controlled
by the state, Alitalia can be considered an outlier compared to
SAS and AF in terms of growth and profitability.
Thus, we evaluate the impact of the full privatisation on Iberia
(IB) and Lufthansa (LU) against a control sample of two State
controlled airlines (SAS and AF), while we benchmark British
Airways (BA) against the same LU (which at time of BA
privatisation was a fully state-owned company of similar size). We
track the difference in some basic indicators of financial and
operating performance between the fully privatised airlines and









1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Cumulative ASK growth rate differential Cumulative employee growth rate differential
Cumulative revenues growth rate differential Average salaries differential
GRAPH 2
ALITALIA VS SAS AND AIR FRANCE:
CUMULATIVE GROWTH RATE DIFFERENTIALS
Note: data show the cumulative difference between the yearly growth rate of ASK,
employee and revenues of Alitalia and the (weighted) average growth rate of the
same indicators for Air France and SAS.
Source: calculation on Worldscope, company accounts and AEA data.the control sample (or company) in the three years before the year
of the full privatisation and in the following three years (so we
span a seven year period for each airline).
We  start with some basic financial performance indicators
such as profitability and indebtedness. For profitability we use the
«operating income/sales» ratio and for indebtedness we use the
«financial debt/sales» ratio, since both ratios are less sensitive to
accounting manipulation and to difference in accounting
standards across countries compared to other similar ratios (such
as “net income/sales”, “debt/equity” or “debt/total assets”; in
general, these last two indicators are more sensitive to new equity
capital issue, that is sometimes linked to the privatisation process,
compared to the «debt/sales» ratio).
Graph 3 shows that all the three fully privatised airlines
improve their profitability compared to state-controlled airlines
after the privatisation. The differential in the average «operating
income/sales»  ratio between IB and the control sample in the 3
year before the privatisation was close to zero, but in the 3 years
following privatisation IB «operating income/sales» ratio exceeded
the control sample by roughly 3%. The dynamic for LU is similar
to that of IB, while BA profitability differential against its
benchmark increased dramatically after full privatisation. As far
as leverage is concerned, Graph 3 shows that IB and LU were
considerably less indebted than the benchmark sample before the
privatisation and they remained so thereafter (IB became even less
indebted compared to the control sample, while the “debt/sales”
differential between LU and the control sample reduced); BA was
more indebted than LU before the privatisation but thereafter their
“debt/sales” ratios became similar.
These evidences are pretty much in line with those on
comprehensive multi-country and multi-industry studies on
privatisations, such as Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh (1994),
Boubakri and Cosset (1998) and D’Souza and Megginson (1999),
which show that after privatisation profitability increases and
leverage reduces significantly.
We  now look at the growth rate of investments and output.
Depending on the output or production capacity parameter used
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GRAPH 3
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS OF PRIVATISED AIRLINES
(percentage difference in averages between privatised airlines 
and State controlled airlines in the 3 years before and after privatisation)
Note: Data for State controlled airlines are a weighted average of average of SAS
and Air France.
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GRAPH 4
GROWTH OF PRODUCTION CAPACITY IN PRIVATISED AIRLINES
(percentage difference in average growth rate between privatised airlines
and State controlled airlines in the 3 years before and after privatisation)
Note: Data for State controlled airline are a weighted average of growth rate of
SAS and Air France.
Source: calculation on Worldscope, balance sheet and AEA data.(ASK, sales, number of employee), we get partly different results.
However, Graph 4 shows clearly that IB grew at a much slower
rate than the benchmark sample after the full privatisation (and
also reduced considerably its indebtedness compared to the
benchmark sample, as shown in the previous graph): ASK grew
at a rate 4% lower than the benchmark sample, while sales and
employees at rate, respectively, 12% and 14% lower. The evidences
for BA and LU tend to be different: LU expanded its production
capacity basically at the same rate of the benchmark sample after
the privatisation (and used more debt compared to the benchmark
sample), while BA sales and employees grew faster than its
benchmark after the privatisation by, respectively, 4 and 1%
roughly.
These evidences contrast somewhat with the quoted multi-
country and multi-industry research on privatisations, which show
that on average firms tend to invest more and to expand
significantly their sales after privatisation, while the evidence on
employment is less strong. This is partly due to the difference in
methodology, since we compare difference against a control
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GRAPH 5
CHANGE IN CAPACITY PRODUCTION FOLLOWING PRIVATISATION
(percentage change in absolute average levels in the 3 years 
before and after privatisation)
Source: calculation on Worldscope, balance sheet and AEA data.sample while the mentioned studies report absolute levels of
median or mean changes.
However, if we take absolute changes in the production
capacity indicators, the results are very much in line with the
quoted research: sales and investments (proxied by ASK) grow
significantly after the privatisation, while employment levels grow
less (or reduce as for the IB case; Graph 5).
4.2 Labour relations in the airline industry are somewhat
more complex than in other sectors, both because of the
specialised skills required for some workers — so that substitutes
for such highly skilled employees may not be available on short
notice — and because of the non storability of the good - meaning
that workers can severely damage airlines in terms of lost business
and reputation (Borenstein and Rose, 2006). Moreover, unions’
negotiating power is reinforced when they are linked to the party
in government or when the government itself takes a active role
in negotiations.
Understanding the influence of ownership on labour costs has
been for a long time one of the main issue in privatisation
research. For example, Ng and Seabright (2001), by estimating a
cost function for European airlines, find that a reduction of 10
percentage points in the share of state ownership implies (other
things equal) a 10% reduction in labour rents.
We  try to give some evidence on the issue of the effect of
privatisation on salaries and labour productivity. We measure
average salaries in each year taking total labour costs and benefits
divided by the average number of employees during the same year,
while labour productivity is computed as net revenues divided by
average number of employees.
Graph 6 shows that in the case of IB and LU salaries
differentials against the control sample tend to close up after full
privatisation:
13 both LU and IB had lower average salaries
compared to state controlled airlines before the privatisation, but
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13 We  do not report BA because we do not have data for labour cost for LU
around 1987; we do have data for sales per employee but the differential between
BA and LU tend to be highly affected by the exchange rate volatility in the 7 years
around 1987.while LU average salaries exceeded those of the control sample
following the privatisation, average salaries at IB remained lower
(although the difference against the control sample reduced). This
effect is confirmed looking at absolute changes: all the 3 privatised
airlines experienced an increase in average salaries ranging from
to 15 to 25% (Graph 7).
As far as labour productivity is concerned, both IB and LU
show higher revenues per employee than the control sample after
the privatisation (LU had a higher productivity even before the
privatisation but the gap with the control sample widened further
after the privatisation; IB had a lower productivity before the
privatisation while thereafter it did slightly better than the control
sample); taking absolute changes, all the 3 airlines exhibit an
increase in average revenues per employee by 17-18% after the
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GRAPH 6
LABOUR COST AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
OF PRIVATISED AIRLINES
(percentage difference in averages levels between privatised airlines 
and State controlled airlines in the 3 years before and after privatisation)
Note: Data for State controlled airline are a weighted average of SAS and Air
France data. Salaries are measured as labour cost divided by average number of
employee during the year; labour productivity is measured as net sales divided by
average number of employees; tariffs are measured as net sales divided by RPK.
Source: calculation on Worldscope and balance sheet data.privatisation. This last result is perfectly in line with the previous
mentioned research, which documents an average increase in sales
per employee of roughly 19% after the privatisation (Megginson,
2005).
Turning back to the issue of labour remuneration, it has to be
emphasised that our indicator based on the simple ratio of total
labour cost to the number of employees could be influenced by the
different personnel mix (pilots/co-pilots, cabin crew, maintenance
and ticketing personnel) employed by each airline. For example,
pilots and co-pilots represent only a small portion of the total work
force (ranging on average from 5 to 10%), but their remuneration
account for a disproportionate share of total labour cost (from 20
to 25%).
14
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GRAPH 7
CHANGE IN LABOUR COST AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY
FOLLOWING PRIVATISATION
(percentage change in the absolute average level
in the 3 years before and after privatisation)
Source: calculation on Worldscope and balance sheet data.
14 See DOGANIS R. (2005). Doganis documents that the variance in personnel
mix across major European airlines is quite small, so that our indicator of average
labour cost can be taken as a good proxy to make comparison across companies.A more accurate picture of labour remuneration in the airline
industry can be taken using ICAO statistics on average salaries by
personnel qualification; however, being expressed in US dollar,
ICAO data are not suitable for US-Europe comparisons on long
time horizons, since they are influenced by the strong USD/€
exchange rate volatility. We will use them only for cross-sectional
comparisons confined to the European airlines considered in this
study.
Table 6 shows that by 1995, when all European airlines were
state controlled (except for BA), AF, SAS and IB paid on average
higher salaries than KLM and LU, while BA (fully privatised by 7
years) paid much lower salaries than all the other state controlled
airlines. By 2002, when LU, IB and BA were all fully privatised
(and KLM, as mentioned, had only a relatively modest state voting
influence), salaries paid by privatised companies had grown
significantly (compared to AF salaries) but on average remained
much lower than salaries at SAS and AF.
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TABLE 6
ANNUAL REMUNERATION OF PILOTS AND CABIN CREW 
IN SELECTED EUROPEAN AIRLINES
(Air France = 100; mean State controlled airlines =100)
1992-95 2002
Pilots Cabin crew Pilots Cabin crew
Air France 100 100 100 100
SAS 74.1 93.7 108 153.6
KLM 82.9 58.7 96.9 91.7
Iberia 91.2 101.6 90.3 111.3
Lufthansa 80.8 84.1 83.3 95.2
British Airways 51.8 46 62.3 75.2
mean State controlled
airlines 100 100 100 100
mean privatized airlines
* 60.4 52.5 77.4 81.6
* Includes British Airways for the 1992-95 period and Iberia, Lufthansa and British
Airways for 2002.
Source: calculations on NG C.K. and SEABRIGHT P.  (2001) and DOGANIS R. (2005),
both based on ICAO data.The evidence that on average salaries paid by fully privatised
airlines are much lower than salaries in state-controlled airlines
confirms the finding of Ng and Seabright (2001) that State
ownership substantially increase the share of the rents, due to
regulatory barriers or market power, that accrue to employee (in
the form of both higher salaries and «quiet life»).
5. - The Stock Market Reaction to Full Privatisation
The final issue that we explore is the stock market valuation
of fully privatised airlines. We start with a standard CAPM
approach to test whether there is any difference in stock market
returns between private and state controlled airlines controlling
for their risk (beta); such difference should show up in the
intercept (alpha) of the regression.
We  use a standard CAPM model with one risk factor, given
by the return of the market portfolio, instead of the more
sophisticated multi-factor version of the CAPM proposed by Fama
and French (1993) for the US equity market (which includes
additional risk factors, such as “size” and “book-to-market”).
15 Our
dependent variable is the difference between the returns of a
portfolio made of British Airways, Lufthansa and Iberia stocks
and the returns of a portfolio made of SAS and Air France stocks;
such extra-return on fully privatised airlines is then regressed on




fully privatised airlines – R
t
state controlled airlines = α + β R
t
MSCI + ε
where α captures the extra-return to fully privatised airlines.
We estimate equation (1) taking monthly returns (in order to
avoid the noise in higher frequency data) stating from January
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15 However, BELTRATTI A. et AL. (2007) have questioned the validity of both the
classical CAPM and of the Fama-French multifactor version for the European
equity market. Although we are aware of this, CAPM still remains the only
benchmark theoretical model to analyse stock returns.2002 (so that we can include Iberia in the fully privatised portfolio)
until December 2006 (60 observations). We also try a specification
which includes Alitalia and Finnair among state controlled
portfolio.
A similar approach has been recently pursued by de Bruijin
et al. (2007) who take as dependent variable of a standard CAPM
the difference between the returns of a portfolio of 19 private
airlines and the returns of a portfolio 8 state-controlled airlines,
spanning basically all major world airlines. They find that state-
controlled airlines tend to have a lower beta than private airlines.
However, the interpretation of their results tend to be different
forms ours, since they consider all major private airlines, while
we take only airlines in which the state has sold entirely its stake.
Hence, the alpha of our regression can be viewed as a proxy of
political risk, as in the recent line of research proposed by Beltratti
et al. (2007) and discussed in Section 2.
The results of our estimates, reported in Table 7, show that
the  alpha (or the extra-return of the fully privatised airlines) is
always close to zero and not statistically significant (we tried both
with value weighted and equally weighted portfolios); the same
result is found by de Bruijin et al. (2007) for the “private minus
state controlled” portfolio. Only if we include Alitalia and Finnair
in the state controlled portfolio we get a monthly extra-return for
fully privatised airlines close to 1%, but yet not statistically
significant. In general, our t-statistics are low because we have a
limited number of observations and because portfolios are made
of very few stocks (hence there remains a high variance in returns
due to idiosyncratic noise).
Our results contrast partly with the evidences provided by
Beltratti  et al. (2007), based on a large sample of European
privatised firms spanning different industrial sectors. The authors,
using a Fama-French factor model estimated on European stock
prices, find a positive alpha for the portfolio of the bottom quartile
of privatised firms with respect to the share of the state (i.e. a
portfolio that includes all fully privatised companies plus other
partially privatised companies in which the state residual stake,
depending on the reference year, can be as high as 6.4%). As
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positive alpha as a premium for political risk, i.e. the risk that the
state will change the rule of the game after the full privatisation.
Even though standard CAPM tests tend to show that over the
5-years period 2002-2006 fully privatised airlines have not earned
any extra-return against state-controlled airlines, it is useful to
document the stock market reaction for each private airlines in
the years immediately following the privatisation. We take again
the same benchmarks employed in section 4 and compute the
yearly extra returns (taking into account dividend payments) of
the three fully privatised airlines against the returns of such
benchmarks (for SAS and AF we take the simple average of their
yearly returns adjusted for dividends). Graph 8 shows that fully
privatised airlines substantially outperformed their state-control-
led benchmarks in the 5 years following privatisation. IB and LU
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TABLE 7
CAPM ESTIMATES ON THE DIFFERENCE OF RETURNS 
BETWEEN PRIVATE AND STATE CONTROLLED AIRLINES
alpha beta N. obs.
Private airlines minus state controlled 
airlines (SAS and AF only)
equally weighted portfolios 0.00 –0.20 60
(0.59) (–0.99)
value weighted portfolios 0.00 –0.44 60
(0.38) (–2.53)
Private airlines minus state controlled
airlines (SAS, AF, AL, FA)
equally weighted portfolios 0.01 0.32 60
(0.94) (1.44)
value weighted portfolios 0.01 –0.17 60
(0.90) (–0.97)
Note: The dependent variable is the difference between the monthly return of a
equally (value) weighted portfolio of British Airways, Lufthansa and Iberia and the
monthly return of a equally (value) weighted portfolio of SAS and Air France (plus
Alitalia and Finnair in the 3
rd and 4
th specifications). The indipendent variable is
the monthly returns of MSCI world index. Returns are computed from January
2002 to December 2006 and include dividends. Valves in parenthesis are t-statistics
robust to eteroschedasticity and autocorrelation.strongly outperformed SAS and AF in the three years after the
privatisation and then tend to do worse, but the cumulative extra-
performance over 5 years ranges from 25 to 35%; instead, much
of the BA extra-performance against LU is concentrated the 4
th
and 5
th year after full privatisation.
One possible interpretation of these evidences is that although
in the long run there is no extra-return, or “positive alpha”, to
private airlines, the initial stock market reaction to full privatisa-
tion is positive, mirroring the improved financial and operating
performance against state controlled airlines documented in the
previous section.
6. - Conclusions
In the airlines sector both commercial agreements between
the US and each single European country and the European











Iberia Lufthansa British Airways
GRAPH 8
CUMULATIVE EXTRA-RETURNS OF FULLY PRIVATISED AIRLINES
AGAINST STATE CONTROLLED AIRLINES
Source: calculation on Thomson Financial data. For Iberia and Lufthansa data
show the cumulative yearly extra-returns (taking into account dividends) against
the (simple) average of the returns of SAS and Air France, while for British Airways
data show the extra-return against Lufthansa.regulation include “nationality clauses” (even if in the wider
meaning of “European nationality”). These clauses, conditioning
traffic rights to shareholders nationality, have linked commercial
growth and ownership structure; this link, in turn, has hindered
consolidation and privatisation. Due to troubles which full
privatisation can cause to traffic rights and to a persistent
politicians’ propensity to keep a national flag carrier for prestige
reasons, a mixed ownership regime (combining, for long periods
of time, state with private ownership) has become widespread. For
these reasons the share of state ownership in the airline sector is
one of the highest compared to other industries.
This state of the industry has suggested to focus our research
on the differences between fully and partially privatised carriers.
The three cases of fully privatised European airlines — British
Airways, Lufthansa and Iberia — have many common features, but
some specificity as well. These airlines have undergone deep
restructuring — especially in terms of personnel reduction — much
before (and in view of) the privatisation; all the three privatised
airlines have acquired their main domestic competitors (before,
after or in the same year of the privatisation) and so the
privatisation was always associated with a significant consolidation
in the national market. The state bore most of the financial costs
related to the restructuring (especially in the cases of Lufthansa and
British Airways), while new private shareholders embarked mostly
into commercial and organisational restructuring.
Following full privatisation, airlines show an increase in
profitability and labour productivity (particularly Iberia and
Lufthansa) compared to other major state-controlled airlines, and
expand considerably their production capacity compared to the
pre-privatisation period; average salaries increase considerably
after the privatisation, although in line with the increased labour
productivity. More general evidences on salaries differential
between fully privatised and state controlled airlines tend to
confirm evidences from previous research that state ownership
increase the share of rents that accrue to employees.
In analysing the effects of state ownership on stock market
returns (though our conclusions are based on a simple CAPM
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thoroughly) we find that, controlling for different betas to the
market portfolio, investors do not require an extra-return against
state controlled airlines to invest in fully privatised airlines. One
possible interpretation of this preliminary evidence is that
investors do not seem to require a premium for political risk.
However, the stock market reaction in the years immediately
following privatisation is quite positive, and fully privatised
airlines tend to outperform state controlled airlines.
Summing up, although we do not perform any welfare
analysis, our evidences show that the presence of the state as
shareholder in the European airline industry is detrimental, at
least to firms’ profitability and growth. On the other hand, the
exit of the state does not seem to expose private shareholders to
any significant political risk.
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